Histone variant exchange is a novel epigenetic regulator of cognition. We speculate that H2A.Z, a variant of canonical histone H2A, exerts unique effects on transcription during distinct stages of memory formation, ultimately acting to maintain memory of previous transcriptional states and poise genes for re‐activation. Hippocampus‐dependent memory formation is initiated by transient expression of memory‐related genes, which support the storage of recently acquired memories. Soon after, memories undergo systems consolidation, which transfers memories from the hippocampus to the cortex for long‐term (...) storage, and requires ongoing re‐activation of memory‐related genes. We speculate that learning‐induced H2A.Z eviction from nucleosomes initially contributes to stimulus‐induced transcriptional induction needed for the initial process of memory consolidation. During systems consolidation, we speculate that delayed incorporation of H2A.Z into nucleosomes of memory‐related genes in the cortex is needed to poise genes for rapid re‐activation, thus supporting the long‐term process of memory stabilization.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmotional events tend to be remembered better than neutral events, but emotional states and stimuli may also interfere with cognitive processes that underlie memory performance. The current study investigated the effects of emotional content on working memory capacity, which involves both short term storage and executive attention control. We tested competing hypotheses in a preregistered experiment. The emotional enhancement hypothesis predicts that emotional stimuli attract attention and additional processing resources relative to neutral stimuli, thereby making it easier to encode and (...) store emotional information in WMC. The emotional impairment hypothesis, by contrast, predicts that emotional stimuli interfere with attention control and the active maintenance of information in working memory. Participants completed a common measure of WMC (the operation span task; Turner, M. L., & Engle, R. W. [1989]. Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal of Memory and Language, 28,... (shrink)

The opportunity cost model offers an ultimate explanation of ego depletion that helps to move the field beyond biologically improbable resource accounts. The model's more proximate explanation, however, falls short of accounting for much data and is based on an outdated view of human rationality. We suggest that our own process model offers a better proximate account of self-control fatigue.

Birds are not commonly admired for emotional expression, and when they are, the focus is typically on negative states; yet vocal behavior is considered a direct reflection of an individual’s emotional state. Given that over 4000 species of songbird produce learned, complex, context-specific vocalizations, we make the case that songbirds are conspicuously broadcasting distinct positive emotional states and that hearing songs can also induce positive states in other birds. Studies are reviewed that demonstrate that that the production of sexually motivated (...) song reflects an emotional state of anticipatory reward-seeking (i.e., mate-seeking), while outside the mating context song in gregarious flocks reflects a state of intrinsic reward. Studies are also reviewed that demonstrate that hearing song induces states of positive anticipation and reward. This review brings together numerous studies that highlight a potentially important role for the songbird nucleus accumbens, a region nearly synonymous with reward in mammals, in positive emotional states that underlie singing behavior and responses to song. It is proposed that the nucleus accumbens is part of an evolutionarily conserved circuitry that contributes context-dependently to positive emotional states that motivate and reward singing behavior and responses to song. Neural mechanisms that underlie basic emotions appear to be conserved and similar across vertebrates. Thus, these findings in songbirds have the potential to provide insights into interventions that can restore positive social interactions disrupted by mental health disorders in humans. (shrink)

This work is a revision of the False Dilemma Fallacy (FDF). The formalized model (FM)of this fallacy has as its centerpiece a valid disjunctive syllogism, but the disjunctive premise is presumed to be false, thus making the argument unsound. Our revised model (FM2.0) focuses on the formal structure by comparing the given vs. the real argument, which is unsound because of its invalidity. This approach we believe is more pedagogically useful and a better explanation of the fallacious nature of the (...) FDF. It extends the identity of “formal fallacy” to the FDF. The abstract is formatted in two columns. The English abstract goes on this side. (shrink)

We argue that the pratyabhijñā system of Kaśmir Śaivism holds an inconsistent position. On the one hand, the Pratyabhijñā regards Śiva as an impersonal mechanism and the universe, including persons, as not having agency; call this the Impersonal Component. On the other hand, it considers Śiva himself as a person, and individual persons as having agency sufficient to respond to Śiva; call this the Personal Component. We maintain that the Personal Component should be affirmed and the Impersonal Component rejected. The (...) Impersonal Component’s claim that Śiva is unaware of and unaffected by his manifestation should be rejected, and the doctrine of satkāryavāda should be modified. The universe is Śiva’s manifestation, in the first instance, but it also has a relative autonomy from him. Moreover, humans have agency and freedom. Their actions effect Śiva. He grows and develops in response to his manifestation. (shrink)

Summary In his book Serpentum et Draconum Historiae Libri Duo, the sixteenth-century Italian naturalist Ulisse Aldrovandi described and illustrated an alleged dragon that had supposedly been killed in 1572. The ?dragon? became famous and was the centrepiece of Aldrovandi's museum. The specimen, a long-necked, long-tailed, scale-covered biped with a thickened torso and a forked tongue, was unlike any currently known bipedal animal and is therefore suspicious. Even so, an explicit description of its true nature has not been published before now. (...) Here we examine Aldrovandi's description and illustration, compare these with extant animals, and conclude that the specimen was a taxidermic hoax. It was made by attaching the forelimbs of a common toad (Bufo bufo) to a European grass snake (Natrix natrix) the midsection of which had been replaced by that of a fish. Fake dragons abounded in the museums of Renaissance Europe, but only in a few cases has the mystery of their true nature been investigated. Aldrovandi's dragon can now be added to the list of such solved zoological mysteries. (shrink)

The first English translation of Fichte’s second set of 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

Renaissance logician, philosopher, humanist, and teacher, Peter Ramus (1515-72) is best known for his attack on Aristotelian logic, his radical pedagogical theories, and his new interpretation for the canon of rhetoric. His work, published in Latin and translated into many languages, has influenced the study of Renaissance literature, rhetoric, education, logic, and--more recently--media studies. Considered the most important work of Walter Ong's career, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue is an elegant review of the history of Ramist scholarship and (...) Ramus's quarrels with Aristotle. A key influence on Marshall McLuhan, with whom Ong enjoys the status of honorary guru among technophiles, this challenging study remains the most detailed account of Ramus's method ever published. Out of print for more than a decade, this book--with a new foreword by Adrian Johns--is a canonical text for enthusiasts of media, Renaissance literature, and intellectual history. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

We present a meta-analytic review on the processing of negations in conditional reasoning about affirmation problems (Modus Ponens: "MP", Affirmation of the Consequent "AC") and denial problems (Denial of the Antecedent "DA", and Modus Tollens "MT"). Findings correct previous generalisations about the phenomena. First, the effects of negation in the part of the conditional about which an inference is made, are not constrained to denial problems. These inferential-negation effects are also observed on AC. Second, there generally are reliable effects of (...) a negation in the clause referred to by the categorical premise, and these referred-negation effects are constrained to the logically fallacious AC and DA inferences. All findings are presented and discussed in relation to contemporary mental model (MM) and mental logic (ML) theories. It is argued that a double-negation elimination hypothesis provides a sufficient explanation of inferential-negation effects within both MM theory and ML theory, if the latter is extended by a validating search for counter examples. Both MM and ML theories adhere to a processing scheme that allows them to incorporate an account of referred-negation effects based on the thesis that counter-example frequency is modulated by the scope of a contrast class delineated by a false affirmative. We conclude that MM and ML theories provide adequate processing schemes to accommodate for the explanatory hypotheses, at least in principle. In practice, both approaches remain equivocal as regards the connectivity and interactivity with long-term memory knowledge invoked in generating, manipulating, and testing the mental representations of negative state of affairs. (shrink)

J. Gingell, E. P. Brandon; Popular Culture, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 3, 7 March 2003, Pages 461–485, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-97.

Whereas Phillips and colleagues argue that knowledge representations are more basic than belief representations, we argue that an accurate analysis of what is fundamental to theory of mind may depend crucially on the context in which mental-state reasoning occurs. Specifically, we call for increased study of the developmental trajectory of mental-state reasoning within socially evaluative contexts.

In the course of this book we shall frequently appeal to what we call an Arnoldian filter, a principle we wish to urge for choosing much of what should form part of education in schools. This priniciple is based on a remark in Matthew Arnold's Preface to Culture and Anarchy,1 that culture is a matter of getting ‘to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world’ (1935, p.6, emphasis (...) added). Arnold's work here and elsewhere is often seen as a key monument in English humanist thought. Trilling claims that ‘he established criticism as an intellectual discipline among the people of two nations and set its best tone’ (1949, p.3). It may not be of merely historical interest to consider some of the concerns that drove Arnold to offer culture in his sense as a contribution to contemporary and future society. (shrink)

Defenders of high culture can be found invoking many and various allies. Many are, we think, out of place. These defences raise issues that we do not need to worry about or themselves create unnecessary difficulties for clarity of thought on these matters. In this chapter we will touch upon a number of such irrelevancies. We will begin by examining the assimilation of high culture to religion and religious concerns in the thought of Eliot and Scruton: this will allow us (...) to indicate our stance on the place of religion in schools. We will then examine some psychological and sociological issues that Bantock has invoked in defending his secular vision of the role of culture, and conclude with Barrow's curious identification of culture with general intelligence. (shrink)

This chapter deals with a crucial component of our position, the presumption that there are objective grounds for preferring one thing to another within the various cultural institutions we deal with, that there are better or worse symphonies, soufflés and theories of the atom. The task of showing this is more urgent for some institutions than others. While philosophers can doubt anything, most people are persuaded of the objectivity of our efforts to comprehend the physical world and to weigh, count (...) and measure accurately in many areas of human activity. Again, when we are faced with a choice among functional objects or processes, most people will admit that we can ground a preference for a knife or an exercise routine on objectively established facts: sharpness, or measurable increase in strength. Here, certainly, various conflicting desiderata may enter and make actual decisions more difficult — the sharpest knife may also be the most expensive; we may need to worry about its safety features; it may be ugly; and so on. But many will doubt that our judgements of comparative worth for non-functional objects such as paintings or sonatas can claim a similarly objective basis. We shall, therefore, concentrate our efforts on the most doubted areas, but will begin with the less contentious, where we think it is useful to draw attention to the genuine problems some philosophers have stressed, to show in fact that what we believe to be popular unconcern deserves to be somewhat ruffled. (shrink)

The fact that education is, and must be, a process of enculturation for those being educated gives us some, but by no means enough, guidance as to what we would expect to see going on in our schools. For given that our educational institutions are part of our culture and, given that anything that is part of our culture will transmit cultural messages, if we put children in school and let them play all day, or simply asked teachers to explain (...) their hobbies to the children, then some processes of enculturalisation would be going on. But no one with any real concern for either our children or their education would think such things fulfil a proper role for schools. Certainly if, as Arnold thought, education is a question of passing on, or trying to pass on, the features from our culture that we value, then any such reliance on random processes must be ruled out. Instead we have to select those aspects of our culture which we wish our children to partake of and insist that our educational establishments make sustained and intentional efforts to ensure such participation. (shrink)

Arnold wrote in an educational tradition that both lay in a main line of descent from the cultural formations he most valued and equipped him with the tools necessary to appreciate many of the elements in those traditions that are not in his native language. So when he referred, as exemplars of high culture, to Homer and Cicero, Montesquieu and Goethe, he presumed acquaintance with their works in the original languages on his own part and on that of his audience. (...) His own vernacular derived from that of Shakespeare and the Authorised Version of the Bible. (shrink)